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Richard J. Gilbert 2 outside the scope of the exemption. 4 The EC Block Exemption was sometimes criticized as being too formalistic and lacking an economic foundation.
5
The new draft EC Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) and the accompanying Guidelines (EC Guidelines) are, taken together, more similar to the US Guidelines in both style and substance. 6 The Draft TTBER and EC Guidelines were published on 1 October 2003 and have been revised in response to public comments.
This paper refers to the Draft TTBER and EC Guidelines as of 9 February 2004, which differ from the drafts published on 1 October 2003 in significant respects.
The US Guidelines and the EC TTBER and accompanying EC Guidelines are similar in that they:
• Describe the approach that the Agencies use to evaluate licensing arrangements.
• Affirm that technology licensing is generally procompetitive.
• Distinguish licensing transactions that occur between competitors and noncompetitors.
• Observe that applicable law would balance efficiencies against any negative effects on competition from licensing arrangements that do not clearly fix prices or reduce output.
• Recognize that exclusive licenses promote the adoption of new technologies in many circumstances.
• Include "safety zones". The US Guidelines state that "Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint." The EC regulation exempts licenses that do not contain certain "hardcore" restrictions between non-competitors with market shares below 30% and between competitors with market shares below 20%.
Despite their apparent similarities, there are important differences between the US Guidelines and the EC TTBER/Guidelines. Based on these documents, it would be incorrect to conclude that US and EU antitrust policies for intellectual property licensing have "converged". To some extent these differences reflect the different guiding principles in US and EU competition law. But that is not the entire explanation.
II. Conflicting Antitrust Philosophies
The The assessment of whether a licence agreement is restrictive of competition must be made within the actual context in which competition would occur in the absence of the agreement with its alleged restrictions. In making this assessment it is necessary to take account of the likely impact of the agreement on inter-technology competition (i.e. competition between undertakings using competing technologies) and on intra-technology competition (i.e. competition between undertakings using the same technology). Article 81(1) prohibits restrictions of both inter-technology competition and intra-technology competition.
9
The emphasis in the US Guidelines is on inter-technology competition. The US Guidelines say "The Agencies will not require the owner of intellectual property to create competition in its own technology." Contrast this with the EC Guidelines, which say "A technology owner cannot normally be expected to create direct competition with himself 5 inside his own technology."
10
The Commission's qualification in the draft EC Guidelines is not immaterial. Specifically, the TTBER classifies as a hardcore restraint the restriction of active or passive sales to end users by a licensee which is a member of a selective distribution system and which operates at the retail level, even though the licensor and the licensee are not competitors. An identical provision appears in the EC block exemption for vertical agreements.
11
Consistency between the block exemptions for licensing and for vertical agreements is beneficial in some respects. Indeed, the US Guidelines apply the same general antitrust principles to intellectual property as to other forms of property.
12
The Commission's hostility toward exclusive distribution networks stems from Article 81 (1) The EC Guidelines impose a significant burden of proof on the parties to a licensing arrangement to defend restrictions that limit intra-technology competition. The EC The US Guidelines also consider whether licensing restrictions can be justified in light of less restrictive alternatives. The US Guidelines, however, impose a lower burden on the parties to justify a licensing restriction and state:
8
The existence of practical and significantly less restrictive alternatives is relevant to a determination of whether a restraint is reasonably necessary. If it is clear that the parties could have achieved similar efficiencies by means that are significantly less restrictive, then the Agencies will not give weight to the parties' efficiency claim. In making this assessment, however, the Agencies will not engage in a search for a theoretically least restrictive alternative that is not realistic in the practical prospective business situation faced by the parties.
17
Instead of the Commission's requirement that a restraint be "objectively necessary", the US Guidelines use the term "reasonably necessary" and state that "the Agencies will not engage in a search for a theoretically least restrictive alternative that is not realistic in the practical prospective business situation faced by the parties." 
III. Competition and Reciprocity
The TTBER distinguishes licensing arrangements along two dimensions: (1) To the extent that the cross-licenses cover blocking patents, they are non-reciprocal in the language of the TTBER. Hundreds of these agreements exist and they rarely raise antitrust concerns.
20
These licenses allow companies to transfer intellectual property where it can be most efficiently exploited and to achieve the freedom to design, manufacture, and sell competing products without infringing intellectual property rights owned by others. The Commission properly has carved out a niche to exempt these types of licenses, even though they involve firms that are competitors.
The TTBER block exempts certain types of restricted agreements between noncompetitors without regard to whether the licenses are reciprocal or non-reciprocal. For example, suppose that Beta is not in the polypropylene business, but happens to own a patent on a competitive process to manufacture high-density polypropylene. The TTBER would block exempt a transaction in which Alpha and Beta cross-license their patents, provided the licenses do not restrict passive sales from licensees after the first two years of the contract.
The theory for block exempting reciprocal licenses between non-competing entities is that they do not harm competition because the entities are not competitors with or without the license. These transactions, however, are not without antitrust risk if they involve other competitors. For example, Alpha and Beta could cross-license their technologies and charge each other high royalties. Beta, although not itself in the polypropylene business, could license another polypropylene manufacturer at a high royalty, and share the profits with Alpha.
21
The market share limitation in the block exemption greatly reduces the risk that this cascade of licensing arrangements would harm competition, but the low market share thresholds also undermine the value of the block exemptions for the vast majority of transactions that are not harmful to competition.
IV. Safety Zones
The The definition of markets and the calculation of market shares are more complicated for new technologies. Do plasma TVs compete with conventional cathode-ray TVs? It is unlikely that a 10% change in the price of $500 conventional TVs would have much impact on the demand for $5000 plasma TVs. The cross-elasticity of demand between these products is low, which suggests that they are not in the same market. As the technology matures and the prices of plasma TVs fall, plasma and conventional TVs become closer substitutes and may be considered to be in the product market.
In many instances, market definition for new technologies is so imprecise that the market share thresholds of 20% for competing undertakings and 30% for non-competing 12 undertakings are likely to be within the noise level for calculations of market shares for these technologies. This is not cause to reject the use of market thresholds if there is concern that transactions between undertakings with shares above the thresholds may be 
IV. Converging, But Still Apart
The TTBER and the accompanying guidelines go a long way toward harmonizing antitrust policy for licensing arrangements between the US and the European Union. The new block exemption is consistent with the US Guidelines in many respects. Moreover, the EC Guidelines express an analytical framework for evaluating the antitrust risks from licensing arrangements that is close to the framework described in the US Guidelines.
Despite the many similarities in the US and EU policy documents, there are important It is easy to be a critic, and having once been in the business of writing guidelines, I
should be more considerate of the challenges faced by the authors of the EC TTBER and
Guidelines. The proposed TTBER and Guidelines are significant accomplishments.
They present a framework to evaluate technology licensing arrangements that respects the objectives of EU competition policy and still provides a berth for procompetitive licensing. The publication of the Guidelines along with the TTBER is a positive step.
The Guidelines articulate the reasons why licensing restriction appear on or are excluded from the list of prohibited restrictions.
Skeptics can argue that the proposed TTBER eliminates the list of permitted licensing practices in the old technology transfer block exemption regulation and that all practices are now suspect for arrangements that exceed the market share thresholds. This is a pessimistic view. The Guidelines provide a foundation for the proposed TTBER and inform businessmen and practitioners about the types of transactions that may raise antitrust concerns in the European Community. The Guidelines also provide an analytical methodology that extends to licensing arrangements that are not covered by the block exemption, such as multi-lateral cross-licensing and technology pools. The new TTBER is a more flexible document than the current block exemption and, reasonably applied, can provide appropriate guidance for pro-competitive licensing arrangements. If only the Commission would recognize that procompetitive licensing may reduce intratechnology competition and be flexible towards restrictions that appear on its hardcore 16 list, we would have a closer alignment of US and EU competition policy for licensing arrangements.
